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ABSTRACT 
  The forum non conveniens (“FNC”) doctrine allows a federal court 
to dismiss a case from the U.S. legal system in favor of a more 
convenient foreign jurisdiction. When a party moving for dismissal 
under the FNC doctrine succeeds, the losing party may immediately 
appeal that decision as of right to an appellate court. But if the motion 
to dismiss for FNC is denied, the right to an appeal is unavailable until 
after a final judgment is issued in the case.  
  This dichotomy in appellate review results from Van 
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, where the Supreme Court held that motions 
to dismiss for FNC do not fall within the collateral order exception to 
the final judgment rule in federal courts.  
  Yet motions to dismiss for FNC by definition deal with transnational 
disputes, and the Supreme Court has recently been limiting the ability 
for transnational litigation to proceed in U.S. courts. This Note argues 
that the values underpinning the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
restrictive of transnational litigation—separation of powers, comity, 
fairness, and efficiency—similarly support the Supreme Court altering 
the appellate regime for denied motions to dismiss for FNC to allow for 
immediate appeals as of right.  
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  Currently, there are some limited, case-by-case opportunities to seek 
interlocutory review of FNC denials. But these mechanisms have 
proven to be ineffective. Overruling Biard is the best way to alter the 
appellate framework for denied motions to dismiss for FNC. Doing so 
would strengthen the utility of the FNC doctrine and serve the Supreme 
Court’s interest in limiting the volume of transnational litigation heard 
in U.S. federal courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a defendant in a lawsuit in U.S. federal court. 
For more than three and a half years, you spend significant time and 
resources litigating a claim. Although you initially file a motion to 
dismiss the case, the district court denies your motion. This forces you 
to proceed to trial, where you lose on the case’s merits. Afterwards, 
you make an appeal to the circuit court of appeals. There, as suddenly 
as the litigation began, it ends without any discussion of the merits. This 
time, you emerge victorious: the circuit court orders the trial court 
judgment vacated and the case removed from the U.S. legal system in 
favor of litigation in a foreign state’s courts. 
Your victory is bittersweet. While you achieved your desired 
result, you know that you will never get back the time, money, and 
energy spent litigating a case that you sought dismissed—for the very 
reasons provided by the circuit court, no less—over three years earlier. 
The rules for appealing decisions in federal courts did not allow you to 
seek reversal of the district court’s earlier denial of your motion, and 
this forced you to continue litigating until the court of appeals could 
hear your case after final judgment at trial. 
This hypothetical was the reality in Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno 
A.A.,1 a case dealing with the “wrongful death claims of the Peruvian 
survivors of a Peruvian sailor killed in the United States while serving 
on a Peruvian flag vessel, owned by Peruvian citizens, under articles 
prepared pursuant to a Peruvian collective bargaining agreement.”2 
Following a trial on the merits, the case was dismissed on appeal based 
on a motion to dismiss first filed by the defendant and denied by the 
district court judge more than three years earlier.3  
 
 1. Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 2. Id. at 877 (emphasis added). 
 3. Id. at 881.  
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The motion at issue was a motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens (“FNC”), which, in the federal courts,4 argues that an 
alternative forum exists outside of the United States that is both 
adequate to hear the litigation and more convenient for this purpose 
than the U.S. court.5 The FNC doctrine is a judicially developed 
common law doctrine6 that U.S. courts have used for more than two 
centuries.7 The doctrine remains a viable tool for courts to dismiss 
transnational cases from the U.S. legal system,8 but a dismissal for FNC 
is initially left to the discretion of a federal trial judge.9 
A difficulty arises when one of the litigants seeks review of the 
district court judge’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for FNC. If the trial 
judge grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff may 
immediately appeal that decision to the circuit court,10 arguing that the 
judge abused her discretion in granting the motion.11 However, if the 
trial judge instead denies the motion to dismiss for FNC, no immediate 
 
 4. It is important to note that most states also have some form of the FNC doctrine and, 
while many states mirror the federal doctrine in their own law, FNC is not uniform at the state 
level. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 356–57 (6th ed. 2018) (noting that all states except Montana, which has 
rejected the doctrine, and Idaho and Oregon, which have not formally adopted the doctrine, 
incorporate the FNC doctrine into state law through cases or statutes that mirror the federal 
common law doctrine or that include modifications to make state law more stringent than the 
federal FNC analysis). When this Note discusses the FNC doctrine, it exclusively refers to the 
uniform federal standard. 
 5. See id. at 347 (noting that, under the FNC doctrine, “a U.S. court may dismiss an action 
(otherwise within its jurisdiction) in favor of a substantially more convenient and appropriate 
foreign forum”). 
 6. Id. at 349. 
 7. See RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, 
GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS 38 (2007) (noting that use of the FNC doctrine by U.S. courts can be traced as far 
back as the year 1801). 
 8. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1430–31 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(highlighting the continuing availability of the FNC doctrine to dismiss transnational litigation 
from U.S. courts).  
 9. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The Case for 
Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 446 (2012) (noting that a district court has discretion 
to dismiss a case under the FNC doctrine). 
 10. See MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE: A 
COMPARATIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 49 (2004) 
(identifying that a dismissal for FNC is subject to appellate review). 
 11. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (“The forum non conveniens 
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”). 
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appeal as of right is permitted; the movant only has a right to raise the 
issue on appeal following a final judgment.12  
This dichotomy in appealability as of right for FNC rulings arises 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard.13 In 
Biard, the Court held that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC do not 
fall within the collateral order doctrine—a narrow exception to the 
final judgment rule that permits appellate review of certain 
interlocutory orders.14 Consequently, litigants, like those in Gonzalez, 
may proceed through the time and expense of discovery, motion 
practice, and trial only to be kicked out of the U.S. legal system on 
appeal.15  
Yet few parties will ever successfully obtain reversal by an 
appellate court of a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for 
FNC after trial on the case’s merits.16 This is not because erroneous 
denials of motions to dismiss do not occur; rather, numerous factors—
notably including the significant financial costs of and time involved in 
litigating a case on the merits—lead the vast majority of litigants to 
settle their cases before trial.17 In addition, a party challenging an FNC 
denial after final judgment “must display substantial prejudice” on 
appeal.18 Such prejudice cannot be shown when the moving party is 
otherwise successful on the merits during the appeal.19 Consequently, 
“review after final judgment is ineffective to vindicate a wrongfully 
denied motion for FNC.”20  
 
 12. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (indicating that denials of 
motions to dismiss for FNC are “unsuited for immediate appeal as of right”). 
 13. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988). 
 14. Id. at 530 (holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC is not “a collateral 
order subject to appeal as a final judgment”). 
 15. See Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Although . . . 
a trial on the merits has occurred[,] . . . we believe Neptuno has shown sufficient prejudice to 
warrant vacating that judgment and, in effect, transferring the case to Peru.”). 
 16. Research for this Note has identified Gonzalez as the only such instance. 
 17. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009) (“Casual conventional wisdom 
often has it that about 95 percent of cases settle.”). 
 18. Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. Samaraneftegaz, 592 F. App’x 8, 9 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation 
omitted). This standard at least requires the appellant to illustrate the content of additional 
evidence that would have been available in the non-U.S. forum and how the use of that evidence 
may have changed the result in the case. See id. at 9–10 (determining that appellant “failed to 
demonstrate the prejudice necessary to challenge the forum non conveniens ruling” because 
appellant did not “proffer[] what testimony [a witness unable to testify in the U.S. forum] might 
have given or how that testimony might have affected the case’s outcome”). 
 19. Indasu Int’l, C.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 861 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 20. In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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Further, parties are rarely able to seek immediate appellate review 
of a denied motion to dismiss for FNC before final judgment.21 
Defendants in the Gonzalez case sought such review through a 
certification for interlocutory appeal and a writ of mandamus.22 Both 
efforts were unsuccessful,23 and this is the norm for defendants seeking 
immediate appellate review of a denied FNC motion.24  
The dichotomy in the availability of prompt appellate review for 
FNC decisions has particular salience in the context of transnational 
litigation, where forum selection concerns are particularly acute.25 This 
Note adopts a working definition of transnational litigation as “cases 
involving foreign parties, foreign harms, or foreign law.”26 In 
transnational cases, the choice of forum is highly contested because 
different forums can substantially affect the outcome of a case on its 
merits.27 Numerous reasons exist for the impact of various forums on 
transnational litigation, including that rules governing procedure, 
substance, and choice of law differ far more significantly across 
countries than they do across U.S. states.28 Moreover, differences in 
political and socioeconomic backgrounds of lawyers and courts are 
more pronounced in the transnational setting, as are risks of forum bias 
and concurrent litigation proceedings.29 Finally, judgment enforcement 
can be more difficult in the transnational litigation context than when 
litigating within a single domestic jurisdiction.30 
Additionally, forum selection for transnational litigation is 
especially important when one of the potential forums is a U.S. federal 
court.31 Jury trials, contingency fees, broad discovery, high damages 
awards (including punitive damages), and the fact that each party 
typically covers its own attorneys’ fees are all distinguishing features of 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 877–78 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470 (noting that certification and mandamus are “only rarely 
applied in forum non conveniens cases”). Certification and mandamus are discussed in-depth 
within Part II. 
 25. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 3. 
 26. Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 391 (2017). 
 27. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access 
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 783 (1985) (“The choice of forum has thus become a key 
strategic battle fought to increase the chances of prevailing on the merits.”). 
 28. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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litigation in a U.S. forum compared to litigation elsewhere in the 
world.32 These characteristics tend to be plaintiff friendly,33 and they 
have resulted in the general idea that “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, 
so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case 
into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”34 
Yet the Supreme Court has recently made it tougher for 
transnational litigation to proceed in U.S. federal courts.35 For 
example, the Supreme Court has restricted the extraterritorial reach of 
numerous federal statutes, tightened the requirements for personal 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants, and heightened the pleading 
standards required of plaintiffs, all of which help to limit transnational 
litigation in U.S. federal courts.36 The FNC doctrine remains a key tool 
for defendants seeking the dismissal of complaints with extensive 
foreign connections, but the Supreme Court has not altered the 
landscape of appellate review for FNC motions in its recent decisions 
despite otherwise increasing restrictions on transnational litigation. 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should reverse its 
current doctrine to allow for immediate appeals as of right from orders 
denying motions to dismiss for FNC. Doing so would be in line with 
the Court’s current jurisprudential trends restricting transnational 
litigation in U.S. federal courts. Immediate appellate review would also 
further the policy rationales—including respect for the separation of 
powers, adherence to general principles of international comity, and 
concerns about litigation fairness and efficiency—underlying recent 
Supreme Court decisions in this area.  
This argument contributes to the burgeoning academic discussion 
surrounding transnational litigation in U.S. courts37—a conversation 
 
 32. Id. at 3–4. 
 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (AC) at 733 (Eng.). 
 35. See GEORGE T. CONWAY, III, JOHN BELLINGER, III, R. REEVES ANDERSON & JAMES 
L. STENGEL, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FEDERAL CASES FROM FOREIGN 
PLACES: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS LIMITED FOREIGN DISPUTES FROM FLOODING U.S. 
COURTS 1 (2014) (“Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court . . . have cut back 
attempts to involve U.S. courts in controversies with minimal, if any, connection to the United 
States.”). 
 36. See id. at 1, 42 (identifying that recent Supreme Court decisions have restricted 
extraterritoriality and utilized tougher jurisdiction and pleading standards to limit transnational 
litigation in U.S. federal courts). 
 37. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: 
The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) (highlighting an 
increasing reluctance by U.S. courts to hear transnational cases); John F. Coyle, The Case for 
Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2015) (discussing the U.S. 
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with important global implications for litigants, lawyers, and the legal 
profession. This Note engages with this dialogue by taking the Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence and supporting policy rationales as a 
given while suggesting an additional mechanism by which the Court 
could further its stated goal of limiting transnational litigation: 
reforming the appellate regime for denied motions to dismiss for FNC. 
The Note proceeds in five substantive parts. Part I outlines and 
provides the policy rationales for the FNC doctrine, the final judgment 
rule, and the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Part 
I also presents the Supreme Court’s Biard decision, which combined 
these doctrines to hold that denied motions to dismiss for FNC are not 
immediately appealable as of right. Part II critiques the appellate 
framework resulting from the Biard decision by detailing the failures 
of the current regime for appealing FNC denials. Part III then 
illustrates the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence restricting 
transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. Part IV follows by 
arguing that reversing Biard and allowing immediate appeals from 
FNC denials fits within this trend and supports the separation of 
powers, comity, fairness, and efficiency values used by the Court to 
justify restrictions on transnational litigation. Part V responds to 
potential counterarguments to this proposal. 
I.  FORUM NON CONVENIENS, THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE, AND 
THE COLLATERAL ORDER EXCEPTION: A PRIMER ON THE 
DOCTRINES AND THE BIARD HOLDING 
 The current appellate framework for denied motions to dismiss 
for FNC results from the interplay of various doctrines and case law. 
The FNC doctrine allows a federal court to dismiss a case from the U.S. 
legal system in favor of a more convenient foreign jurisdiction. The 
final judgment rule prevents interlocutory orders in a case from being 
immediately appealed to an appellate court unless the order falls 
within the collateral order exception to the rule. The Supreme Court 
held in Biard that denied FNC motions do not fall within the exception, 
thereby resulting in the dichotomous appellate framework for motions 
 
judiciary’s perceived retreat from international law and its effect for litigants seeking to use U.S. 
courts as a litigation forum); Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941 (2017) 
(discussing the use of parochial procedures favoring U.S. parties in U.S. courts); Austen L. 
Parrish, Fading Extraterritoriality and Isolationism? Developments in the United States, 24 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2017) (opining on the conventional perspective that U.S. courts are 
limiting transnational litigation). 
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to dismiss for FNC. This Part details these doctrines, the policy 
rationales for each, and the facts and holding of the Biard case as 
background on current law and concludes by highlighting how lower 
courts have criticized the Supreme Court’s approach and holding in 
Biard. 
A. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
Forum non conveniens is designed “to respond to those limited 
instances in which the plaintiff’s chosen forum was highly inconvenient, 
either from the perspective of the defendant or the chosen forum.”38 In 
the federal court system, the FNC doctrine is part of federal procedural 
common law.39 When invoked, the doctrine serves as a mechanism to 
dismiss a case from the U.S. legal system.40  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno41 
outlines the doctrine as it stands today.42 As articulated in Piper, 
conducting an FNC analysis is a two-step process43 left to the discretion 
of the district court judge and subject to the abuse of discretion 
standard of appellate review.44 The first step in the FNC analysis is to 
ask whether an adequate alternative forum is available.45 Being 
“amenable to process” in another jurisdiction will ordinarily satisfy the 
requirement.46 But even if a party is amenable to process in another 
jurisdiction, the alternative forum may still be deemed inadequate if no 
satisfactory remedy is available.47 A lack of satisfactory remedy 
includes, but is not limited to, situations where the forum forbids 
litigation over the dispute’s subject matter.48 Notably, the mere fact 
 
 38. JOACHIM ZEKOLL, MICHAEL COLLINS & GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, TRANSNATIONAL 
CIVIL LITIGATION 371 (2013). 
 39. See id. at 393 (“The forum non conveniens principles . . . are generally thought to be 
procedural principles applied in the federal courts, as a matter of federal common law.”). 
 40. Id. at 372. 
 41. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).  
 42. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that Piper Aircraft “is the leading 
contemporary statement of the forum non conveniens doctrine”). 
 43. BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 73. 
 44. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257 (“The forum non conveniens determination is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been 
a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”). 
 45. See id. at 254 n.22 (“At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must 
determine whether there exists an alternative forum.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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that the law in the alternative forum may be less favorable to the 
plaintiff is not enough to deem the forum inadequate.49 Similarly, a 
change in law favorable to the movant, even when the movant engages 
in “reverse forum-shopping” and purposely seeks more favorable law 
through an FNC motion, should not be considered in the FNC 
analysis.50 If there is no adequate alternative forum available, the 
motion to dismiss for FNC will be denied and the litigation will 
continue.51  
If an adequate alternative forum does exist, the inquiry proceeds 
to the second step of the FNC analysis, which is a balancing of public 
and private interest factors.52 Private interest factors include: “the 
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory 
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining 
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises . . . ; and 
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious 
and inexpensive.”53 Public interest factors include: 
the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home; the 
interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home 
with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of 
unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of 
foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated 
forum with jury duty.54 
In balancing the public and private interest factors, no single factor 
is dispositive.55 Further, deference is owed to the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum, which is assumed to be convenient,56 although foreign plaintiffs 
 
 49. See id. at 247 (“The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat a motion 
to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that 
would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the present 
forum.”). 
 50. Id. at 252 n.19. 
 51. See BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 73 (noting that proof of an adequate 
alternative forum is required first before continuing to the second step of the FNC analysis). 
 52. See id. (identifying that “a balancing of private and public interest factors to determine 
the most appropriate forum” comes after concluding that an adequate alternative forum is 
available). 
 53. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (citation omitted). 
 54. Id. (citation omitted). 
 55. See id. at 249–50 (“If central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non 
conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.”). 
 56. Id. at 255–56. 
EIBLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:40 PM 
1202  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1193 
receive less deference than citizens or residents of the forum.57 That 
said, dismissal is possible even from a plaintiff’s home forum when 
public and private interest factors suggest that litigation in the forum 
would overly burden the defendant or court.58 The FNC inquiry is 
ultimately focused on convenience;59 dismissal for FNC may therefore 
be granted when a plaintiff chooses a forum only for its favorable law, 
or merely to annoy a defendant, rather than for the forum’s 
convenience.60 
The FNC analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry designed to afford 
flexibility to judges.61 Because the FNC issue can be decided before 
addressing whether jurisdiction is proper,62 district court judges can 
promptly dismiss cases without expending unnecessary time and 
resources. Further, a court can impose conditions on FNC dismissals to 
ensure that the alternative forum is truly adequate.63 Such conditions 
often include requirements that the movant accept jurisdiction in the 
alternative forum or agree to pay any judgment that the foreign 
jurisdiction renders.64 If the conditions are not met, or the alternative 
forum refuses to accept the case, the litigation returns to the U.S. trial 
court.65 
The Supreme Court has fashioned the FNC doctrine to consider 
“interests of justice.”66 The Court has noted the attractiveness of U.S. 
courts to foreign plaintiffs and highlighted that, on a systemic level, 
docket congestion would only increase in already-crowded U.S. courts 
without dismissals based on FNC.67 At the same time, the doctrine 
“represents a clear choice for equity over efficiency [in individual 
 
 57. Id. at 255 n.23. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 248–49 (noting that a previous Supreme Court case held “that the central focus 
of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience”). 
 60. Id. at 249 n.15. 
 61. See id. at 249–50 (“[E]ach case turns on its facts. If central emphasis were placed on any 
one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes 
it so valuable.” (citation omitted)). 
 62. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007) (“We hold 
that . . . a court need not resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate the cause (subject-matter 
jurisdiction) or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that, in any event, a 
foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case.”). 
 63. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 413. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254. 
 67. Id. at 251–52. 
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cases], and for fairness in a particular case over predictability of 
procedural status.”68 The doctrine also serves to promote various 
additional interests, including the efficient and fair use of U.S. domestic 
legal resources, the avoidance of inappropriately expansive potential 
liability for U.S. defendants, and paying deference to the interests and 
policies of foreign forums.69 
B. The Final Judgment Rule and Its Collateral Order Exception 
Under the final judgment rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291,70 the 
courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions 
of the district courts of the United States.”71 Notably, a district court 
decision is “final” when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”72 Consequently, 
an order from the district court granting a motion to dismiss for FNC 
is immediately appealable—it ends the litigation in the district court. 
But a district court order denying a motion to dismiss for FNC is not 
immediately appealable because the parties are free to continue the 
litigation.73  
The rationales for the final judgment rule are straightforward. The 
rule allows for comprehensive review upon final judgment of different 
stages of the litigation’s proceedings.74 Further, the rule prevents 
piecemeal appellate review of litigation from clogging the legal 
system.75 The final judgment rule is therefore an outgrowth of 
Congress’s desire to avoid the inefficiencies and excess costs that result 
from repeated, frivolous, or unnecessary appeals in the federal courts.76 
 
 68. BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 73. 
 69. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 369–70. 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). The statute applies to all federal courts of appeals other than 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citation omitted). 
 73. See ZEKOLL et al., supra note 38, at 394 (“[O]nly the granting (but not the denial) of a 
motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is immediately appealable under the final 
judgment rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”). 
 74. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 75. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). 
 76. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (noting that policy interests underlying 
§ 1291 include “the sensible policy of avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come 
from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various 
rulings to which a litigation may give rise” (citations omitted)). 
EIBLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:40 PM 
1204  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1193 
The collateral order doctrine is a judicially developed exception to 
the final judgment rule.77 The doctrine allows immediate appeals as of 
right from interlocutory orders that “fall in that small class which 
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, 
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration 
be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”78 The doctrine 
constitutes an effort to read § 1291 practically, rather than technically.79  
It is worth emphasizing that the class of decisions covered by the 
collateral order doctrine is narrow. The Court has held that “[t]o come 
within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final-judgment 
rule . . . the order must [1] conclusively determine the disputed 
question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from 
a final judgment.”80 The Court has noted that these conditions are 
“stringent” so that the collateral order exception does not overpower 
the final judgment rule.81 
The policy rationale favoring the collateral order doctrine is 
clear—some interlocutory orders are on issues so important, yet 
distinct from the case’s merits, that requiring a party to wait until after 
a final judgment to appeal the order effectively extinguishes the right 
at issue.82 Under this rationale, denied motions to dismiss for FNC, as 
a class, are a prime candidate for immediate appellate review as of 
right. Forcing a movant to wait until after final judgment for review of 
the issue virtually destroys the movant’s right to litigate in an 
appropriate forum. But, as explained below, the Supreme Court 
rejected this rationale in Biard, holding that the denial of a motion to 
dismiss for FNC does not fall within the collateral order exception to 
the final judgment rule.83  
 
 77. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1978) (noting that the Court 
had developed the “exception” in a previous decision); Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and 
Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 426–27 (2013) (identifying the 
collateral order doctrine as “one of the existing judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule”). 
 78. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
 79. See id. (“The Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical rather than 
a technical construction.” (citations omitted)).  
 80. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. 
 81. Will, 546 U.S. at 349–50. 
 82. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
 83. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 530 (1988). 
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C. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard 
The basic facts of Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard are straightforward. 
Biard, a resident of Belgium, filed a civil suit in U.S. district court 
against Van Cauwenberghe, also a Belgian resident, over a defaulted 
loan relating to a U.S. mortgage.84 Biard asserted claims under federal 
statutory law, the common law of fraud, and other provisions of state 
law.85 Van Cauwenberghe moved to dismiss the civil suit for FNC, but 
the district court summarily denied the motion.86 The court of appeals 
affirmed this decision “in a one-line order” citing precedent on the 
collateral order doctrine, and the Supreme Court then granted 
certiorari.87 
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision denying 
Van Cauwenberghe an immediate appeal as of right from his denied 
motion to dismiss for FNC.88 In doing so, the Court concluded “that the 
question of the convenience of the forum is not completely separate 
from the merits of the action[] . . . and thus is not immediately 
appealable as of right.”89 Step two of the FNC analysis asks district 
courts to identify whether the chosen forum is inconvenient enough to 
warrant dismissal.90 Because that assessment—which involves 
reviewing a party’s ability to access evidence, determining the 
availability of witnesses, and assessing the forum’s interest in deciding 
the controversy—requires the district court to engage with the merits 
of the parties’ dispute at the FNC stage, the denial of an FNC motion 
does not fall into the collateral order exception.91  
The Court did concede that “[i]t is . . . undoubtedly true that in 
certain cases, the [FNC] determination will not require significant 
inquiry into the facts and legal issues presented by a case, and an 
immediate appeal might result in substantial savings of time and 
expense for both the litigants and the courts.”92 Yet the Court made 
clear that it considers categories of cases, and not individual disputes, 
 
 84. Id. at 519–20. 
 85. Id. at 520. 
 86. Id. at 521. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 530. 
 89. Id. at 527 (citation omitted). 
 90. Id. at 528. 
 91. Id. at 528–29. 
 92. Id. at 529. 
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when determining appealability under § 1291.93 Ultimately, the Court 
“believe[d] that in the main, the issues that arise in forum non 
conveniens determinations will substantially overlap factual and legal 
issues of the underlying dispute, making such determinations unsuited 
for immediate appeal as of right under § 1291.”94  
The Court’s decision in Biard was not inevitable. The Fourth 
Circuit had previously held that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC 
were immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,95 and 
some state courts had as well.96 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
rationale has been subsequently criticized. The Third Circuit noted in 
dictum that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent when discussing 
the FNC doctrine, because “in a context other than the collateral-order 
doctrine . . . the Supreme Court . . . ha[s] held forum non conveniens 
dismissals not to be rulings on the merits.”97  
The Supreme Court has responded to these critiques by agreeing 
that, generally, “[a] forum non conveniens dismissal den[ies] audience 
to a case on the merits.”98 The Court maintains that this is consistent 
with Biard, which only focused on the FNC doctrine in the collateral 
order context.99 According to the Court, Biard’s observation about 
overlap between factual and legal issues within the FNC doctrine 
“makes eminent sense when the question is whether an issue is so 
discrete from the merits as to justify departure from the rule that a 
party may not appeal until the district court has rendered a final 
judgment disassociating itself from the case.”100  
In short, the Supreme Court has concluded that the FNC doctrine 
does not generally involve the merits of a case, but the doctrine is 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 142, 145 n.2 (4th Cir. 1988) (reaching the merits 
on appeal of a district court judge’s order denying a motion to dismiss for FNC after concluding 
“that all of the requirements of the rule of Cohen . . . are present”). 
 96. See Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Jefferson, 725 A.2d 487, 495 (D.C. 1999) (indicating that 
reversals of orders denying motions to dismiss for FNC are rare but have been permitted under 
D.C. law). Note that Washington, D.C., would later change its law to align its procedures relating 
to the FNC doctrine with those of the federal courts. See Rolinski v. Lewis, 828 A.2d 739, 742 
(D.C. 2003) (overruling D.C. law allowing FNC denials to be “immediately appealable as a matter 
of right under the collateral order doctrine”). 
 97. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int’l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2006), rev’d, 
549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 98. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 99. Id. at 432–33. 
 100. Id. at 432 (citations omitted). 
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nonetheless still too involved with a case’s merits to satisfy the 
collateral order doctrine’s requirement that the decision in question 
“resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action.”101 This inconsistency in the Court’s reasoning, highlighted by 
the Third Circuit,102 can be resolved by allowing for immediate appeals 
as of right from denied motions to dismiss for FNC under the collateral 
order doctrine. 
II.  FAILURES OF THE CURRENT APPELLATE REGIME FOR DENIED 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FNC 
This Part identifies the limited options available to a litigant 
seeking to immediately appeal a denied motion to dismiss for FNC 
following Biard and highlights the failure of each to afford any 
meaningful appellate review. 
Outside of the collateral order doctrine, litigants have three 
potential options available for appealing an order denying a motion to 
dismiss for FNC: (i) waiting until final judgment after trial to appeal 
the FNC ruling; (ii) using 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to request the 
certification of interlocutory review; and (iii) applying for a writ of 
mandamus.103 None of these options provide effective review of a 
denied motion to dismiss for FNC.  
A. Appeal After Final Judgment 
Waiting for final judgment to appeal an order denying a motion to 
dismiss for FNC is ineffective because the movant will be unlikely to 
meet the substantial prejudice standard after final judgment.104 
Moreover, the work that the FNC doctrine does to avoid 
inconvenience to the parties and the forum will have already been 
undermined if a case makes it to final judgment,105 and remanding the 
case is itself inconvenient, costly, and time consuming.106 Orders 
denying motions to dismiss for FNC are consequently rarely reversed 
on appeal after trial.107  
 
 101. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
 102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 103. See In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing the 
inadequacy of traditional appeals and the use of § 1292(b) while analyzing a mandamus petition). 
 104. Id. at 289. 
 105. Id. (citation omitted). 
 106. Robertson, supra note 9, at 457. 
 107. Id. 
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B. Interlocutory Review Under § 1292(b) 
Use of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) also fails to remedy the erroneous 
denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC.108 Section 1292(b) allows for 
interlocutory appeals in civil cases where an order in question 
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from 
[which] may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation.”109 Notably, the Biard court stated that “[o]ur conclusion 
that the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non 
conveniens is not appealable under § 1291 is fortified by the availability 
of interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).”110 For the 
Biard court, it was enough that § 1292(b) was available when 
necessary.111  
Time has shown that this rationale was misguided. Not only is the 
statutory ground for interlocutory review under § 1292(b) narrow, but 
it also requires approval from both the trial and appellate courts.112 
This is no easy task, as the movant must convince the trial court that it 
should allow an appeal from its own order and the appellate court that 
exceptional circumstances warrant a departure from the statutory final 
judgment rule.113 The appellate court may deny the request for any 
reason.114 These requirements have rendered § 1292(b) ineffective for 
litigants seeking interlocutory review of district court orders,115 as 
certification for review under § 1292(b) occurs very infrequently.116 
 
 108. See In re Lloyd’s, 780 F.3d at 288 (arguing that interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) is limited, which contributes to the lack of effective remedies for erroneous denials of 
motions to dismiss for FNC). 
 109. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
 110. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988). 
 111. Id. at 530. 
 112. In re Lloyd’s, 780 F.3d at 288. 
 113. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474–75 (1978). 
 114. Id. at 475. 
 115. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1245 
(2007) (noting that “[s]ection 1292(b) has not been an effective method for obtaining appellate 
review over interlocutory orders,” because “the certification requirement gives district courts a 
veto over § 1292(b) appeals” and “the federal appellate courts have narrowly construed 
§ 1292(b)’s requirements so that relatively few certified appeals are accepted”). 
 116. See Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory 
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 195–96 (2001) (noting that district court judges “rarely 
grant certification” and that “[a]ctual appeals are even rarer, because the appellate courts refuse 
to accept review of a significant percentage of certified orders”). 
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More specifically, § 1292(b) is rarely utilized in FNC cases.117 An 
empirical study of certification requests under § 1292(b) in the First 
Circuit from 1958 to 2014 identified only two attempts to achieve 
certification in FNC cases, both of which were unsuccessful.118 
Similarly, a survey of certification requests in the Federal Circuit 
between 1995 and 2010 identified 117 petitions under § 1292(b),119 none 
of which were related to an FNC motion.120 Moreover, there is good 
reason to believe that these numbers underestimate denials of 
certification—they disregard petitions denied at the district court level, 
and decisions denying certification are rarely reported.121 
Ultimately, a movant will rarely obtain reversal of a denied FNC 
motion under § 1292(b). It appears that, in the three decades since 
Biard, only two decisions have been reported in which courts granted 
§ 1292(b) petitions and reversed denials of motions to dismiss for 
FNC.122 Consequently, the Supreme Court’s confidence that § 1292(b) 
can serve as a mechanism for appealing erroneous denials of motions 
to dismiss for FNC has proven to be unfounded. 
C. A Writ of Mandamus 
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy123 rarely applied in FNC 
cases.124 Congress has codified the availability of the writ of mandamus 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a): “The Supreme Court and all courts established 
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law.”125 The Supreme Court has highlighted that the writ 
 
 117. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470. 
 118. Tony Weigand, Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b): A First 
Circuit Survey and Review, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 183, 250, 252 (2014). 
 119. Alexandra B. Hess, Stephanie L. Parker & Tala K. Toufanian, Permissive Interlocutory 
Appeals at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995-2010), 60 
AM. U. L. REV. 757, 764 (2011). 
 120. See id. app. at 785–843 (identifying the 117 total § 1292(b) petitions considered by the 
Federal Circuit between 1995 and 2010).  
 121. Weigand, supra note 118, at 220. 
 122. See Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 
386, 388–89 (2d Cir. 2011) (remanding a case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for 
FNC after receiving the case on appeal under § 1292(b)); Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (same). 
 123. PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 721 (8th ed. 2014). 
 124. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470. 
 125. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2018). 
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of mandamus is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really 
extraordinary causes,” which includes “only exceptional circumstances 
amounting to a judicial usurpation of power[] . . . or a clear abuse of 
discretion.”126 
Given that mandamus “is one of the most potent weapons in the 
judicial arsenal,” the Supreme Court has required three necessary 
conditions before the writ can be issued.127 First, there must be no other 
adequate means of relief available.128 Second, the petitioner must prove 
a “clear and indisputable” right to mandamus.129 Finally, the issuing 
court must believe mandamus is appropriate.130 In short, while 
mandamus is technically available in FNC cases,131 such relief is 
extraordinarily rare.132 
The complete menu of available relief for litigants seeking to 
appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC is therefore very 
unappealing: neither seeking mandamus, asking for certification under 
§ 1292(b), nor waiting until after final judgment on the merits are likely 
to offer an adequate means of review, and immediate appellate review 
of the decision under the collateral order doctrine is foreclosed by 
Biard.  
III.  CURRENT TRENDS LIMITING TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN 
U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 
As a consequence of both the final judgment rule and the lack of 
meaningful alternatives for obtaining immediate appellate review of 
denied motions to dismiss for FNC, some transnational cases inevitably 
proceed in the U.S. legal system when they should never have been 
litigated in a U.S. forum. Despite this unique treatment of FNC 
motions, the Supreme Court has otherwise sought to restrict 
transnational litigation in the federal courts. This Part uses examples 
from the Court’s recent case law on the presumption against 
 
 126. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 380–81 (citation omitted). 
 129. Id. at 381 (citation omitted). 
 130. Id. (citation omitted). 
 131. See In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2015) (granting a writ 
of mandamus where a motion to dismiss for FNC was erroneously denied “without written or oral 
explanation”). 
 132. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470. 
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extraterritoriality, personal jurisdiction, and pleading standards to 
illustrate this trend.  
Overall, growing evidence suggests that U.S. courts, and 
particularly the Supreme Court, are becoming increasingly hostile to 
transnational litigation.133 Scholars have offered numerous theories for 
this development, including an increased sense of sovereignty,134 “an 
emerging market for transnational law”135 in which U.S. courts are 
becoming less attractive and foreign forums are becoming increasingly 
hospitable to transnational cases,136 and a general concern that U.S. 
taxpayer–funded resources are being used for court cases with limited 
or no connection to the United States.137 The Supreme Court has 
reformed both substantive and procedural law as part of this increasing 
hostility to transnational litigation,138 and immediate appeals from 
FNC denials would be consistent with this aversion.  
While scholar Maggie Gardner has suggested that the Court’s 
recent jurisprudence is reason enough to eliminate the FNC doctrine 
entirely,139 this Note instead argues that the current landscape of 
transnational litigation provides justification for the Supreme Court to 
reform the collateral order doctrine to include denials of motions to 
dismiss for FNC. Immediate appeals as of right from denied FNC 
motions would help further the Supreme Court’s chosen policy of 
limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts by dismissing 
more cases from the U.S. legal system before those cases are 
adjudicated on the merits. 
 
 133. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2015). 
 134. Jodie A. Kirshner, Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations 
to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
259, 292, 294–95 (2012) (identifying attitudes toward sovereignty and a sentiment of “integrity 
anxiety” as impacting U.S. resistance to transnational litigation and international law). 
 135. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1085. 
 136. See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in 
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 
31, 33 (2011) (“[T]he United States is no longer as attractive to litigants as it supposedly once was, 
and . . . other countries will increasingly draw litigants to their courts through a combination of ex 
ante forum selection agreements and ex post forum shopping.”). 
 137. See Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 75, 78 (2014) (identifying “the notions that U.S. courts are funded by American taxpayers 
and that jury pools, too, are a limited resource to be preserved for American plaintiffs” as 
“rationales for why American courts are disinclined to hear cases brought by foreign plaintiffs”). 
 138. See CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 1–2 (highlighting that U.S. courts are 
restricting transnational litigation on statutory and procedural grounds). 
 139. Gardner, supra note 26, at 399.  
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A. Expansion of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
A prominent example of the Supreme Court’s recent skepticism 
toward transnational litigation is its expansion of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. The presumption is a canon of statutory 
interpretation that limits the reach of federal statutes beyond U.S. 
territory.140 The “presumption had all but been given up for dead” 
through the 1980s, but recent cases invoking the presumption have 
served to “foreclose[] a large amount of transnational litigation that 
had formerly been taken for granted, including suits by U.S. 
plaintiffs.”141 These cases include Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.,142 which applied the presumption to securities fraud actions,143 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,144 which applied the presumption 
to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),145 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Community,146 which indicated that the presumption applied to certain 
portions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO),147 and Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,148 which extended Kiobel to 
categorically foreclose the possibility of suing foreign corporations 
under the ATS.149 
RJR Nabisco identifies the robust process a court must now follow 
when determining whether a statute has extraterritorial reach: “At the 
first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality 
has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, 
 
 140. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“It is a longstanding 
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant 
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This principle represents a 
canon of construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 141. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1098–99. 
 142. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 143. Id. at 265 (“In short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) 
applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.”). 
 144. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 145. Id. at 117 (“The principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality thus 
constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS.”). The ATS states that “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
 146. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 147. Id. at 2101 (“[W]e find that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been 
rebutted—but only with respect to certain applications of the statute.”). 
 148. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 149. Id. at 1407 (“[T]he Court holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits 
brought under the ATS.”). 
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affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”150 If Congress 
has shown such intent in the statute, then the statute (or the relevant 
provisions) apply extraterritorially.151 However, 
[i]f the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second step we 
determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the 
statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s “focus.” If the 
conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, 
then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other 
conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus 
occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible 
extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that 
occurred in U.S. territory.152 
The outcome of this recent “retreat to territoriality” by the 
Supreme Court has not been lost on litigants and commentators.153 
“Lower courts are taking the directive seriously, applying the doctrine 
to other areas long thought to defeat the presumption, including . . . 
federal criminal law.”154 Practitioners have argued that Morrison 
“revolutionized” the federal courts’ handling of litigation involving 
U.S. securities laws because, among other things, it “categorically 
extinguished” securities cases involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign 
defendants, and foreign conduct (“foreign-cubed” cases) from U.S. 
federal courts.155 Together, Morrison, Kiobel, RJR Nabisco, and Jesner 
illustrate a clear trend by the Supreme Court to curb the ability of 
transnational litigation to proceed in U.S. federal courts. 
B. Narrowed Availability of Personal Jurisdiction 
This trend is also evident in the Supreme Court’s recent approach 
to personal jurisdiction, which “involves the power of a court to 
adjudicate a claim against the defendant’s person and to render a 
judgment enforceable against the defendant and any of its assets.”156 
Personal jurisdiction has both statutory and constitutional elements; 
the latter is further divided into “general” and “specific” jurisdiction.157 
 
 150. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1098. 
 154. Id. at 1099. 
 155. CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 4 (citation omitted). 
 156. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 79. 
 157. Id. at 79–82, 88. 
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General jurisdiction “permits a court to adjudicate any claim against a 
defendant.”158 Specific jurisdiction “permits only the adjudication of 
claims that are related to or arise out of a defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state.”159 Only one of the two constitutional forms of personal 
jurisdiction is required to proceed with litigation.160 
The Supreme Court narrowed the availability of general 
jurisdiction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown161 and 
Daimler AG v. Bauman.162 Prior to these decisions, the standard had 
been one of reasonableness—general jurisdiction existed when a 
defendant had “sufficiently continuous and systematic” contacts with a 
forum.163 Now, however, a court only has general jurisdiction over a 
defendant if the defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so 
continuous and systematic as to render [the defendant] essentially at 
home in the forum State.”164 This curtails the number of forums to 
which a defendant can be subject to general jurisdiction, and “[f]or 
many corporate defendants, this has reduced their susceptibility to suit 
from just about everywhere to only the forums where they are 
incorporated and perhaps where they have their principal place of 
business.”165 This stricter test renders U.S. courts unable to exert 
general jurisdiction over many foreign defendants at all.166 
The Supreme Court has similarly narrowed the standard for 
specific jurisdiction.167 The J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro168 
case evidences this trend. There, a plurality of the Court explained that 
“[a]s a general rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless 
 
 158. Id. at 88. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Bookman, supra note 133, at 1092–93 (noting that specific jurisdiction over a 
defendant may still be available even when general jurisdiction is not). 
 161. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918, 927 (2011) 
(rejecting general jurisdiction in a transnational litigation case based on a stream of commerce 
theory regarding the limited flow of products from foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. company into a 
U.S. forum). 
 162. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120–21, 139 (2014) (rejecting general jurisdiction 
in a transnational litigation case with a foreign plaintiff, foreign defendant, and foreign injury 
where jurisdiction was asserted based solely on the contacts of the foreign company’s U.S. 
subsidiary with the chosen U.S. forum). 
 163. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1091–92. 
 164. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (citation omitted). 
 165. Gardner, supra note 26, at 432 (citations omitted). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 433 (highlighting that “the Court’s jurisprudence . . . ha[s] checked exorbitant 
invocations of specific jurisdiction as well”).  
 168. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
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the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”169 Applying this standard, the Court refused to 
find jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose product caused injury 
to a New Jersey plaintiff in New Jersey because, despite targeting the 
United States generally for placement of its products, the defendant 
had not purposely availed itself of the New Jersey market 
specifically.170 For the Court, “personal jurisdiction requires a forum-
by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”171 Consequently, 
“[b]ecause the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in 
principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States 
but not of any particular State.”172 
The McIntyre case has been described by one scholar as 
“territoriality on steroids, fetishizing the concept of a purposeful 
contact with a specific sovereign (and its territory) such that even harm 
in a particular territory is insufficient to support jurisdiction without 
accompanying targeted contacts with that sovereign.”173 But whether 
one agrees with the outcome in McIntyre or not, it is clear that, along 
with recent restrictions on general jurisdiction, this narrowing of 
specific jurisdiction increases the likelihood that a court will not have 
the power to hear a transnational case, thereby limiting transnational 
litigation in U.S. federal courts. 
C. Heightened Pleading Standards 
Finally, the Supreme Court has limited transnational litigation in 
U.S. courts by heightening pleading standards from notice pleading to 
plausibility pleading.174 To properly state a claim in federal court, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading need 
only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”175 This requirement gained the moniker 
“notice pleading” after the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. 
 
 169. Id. at 877–78 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
 170. See id. at 878, 885–86 (detailing the facts of the case and identifying that the defendant 
had marketed to the United States generally but not to New Jersey specifically). 
 171. Id. at 884. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1093. 
 174. See CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 42 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s change 
in pleading requirements as limiting the ability to bring transnational claims in U.S. courts). 
 175. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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Gibson,176 which stated that “all the Rules require is a short and plain 
statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what 
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”177 The 
Supreme Court changed course fifty years later in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly,178 where it adopted a “plausibility” standard, holding that 
“we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and 
stated that this requires a plaintiff to “nudge[] their claims across the 
line from conceivable to plausible.”179 The Court expanded this 
standard beyond Twombly’s specific factual context180 two years later 
by concluding, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,181 that plausibility pleading 
requirements apply to all civil actions.182 Consequently, the heightened 
pleading standards apply in transnational cases.183  
Heightened pleading standards can be especially impactful in the 
transnational litigation context. ATS cases, for example, are 
transnational by definition, as they require an alien plaintiff, but they 
also require a “violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”184 Plaintiffs may therefore be required to plead a violation of 
the law of nations with enough particularity to satisfy plausibility 
pleading requirements.185 This is a difficult task and, combined with the 
additional requirements imposed by the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, is likely to foreclose or dissuade foreign plaintiffs 
from bringing claims under the ATS.186 
 
 176. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007). 
 177. Id. at 47. 
 178. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 179. Id. at 570. 
 180. See id. at 553 (“We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an 
antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct and now reverse.” (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted)).  
 181. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 182. See id. at 678 (referencing Twombly while holding that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face” (citation omitted)). 
 183. Childress III, supra note 37, at 1032. 
 184. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
 185. Childress III, supra note 37, at 1033. 
 186. Id. at 1033–34; see also CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 42, 43 n.12 (identifying 
lower court decisions applying heightened pleading standards to dismiss transnational cases under 
the ATS and RICO). 
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D. Supreme Court Justifications for Restricting Transnational 
Litigation Support Strengthening the FNC Doctrine 
Of course, this “restrictive ethos to federal procedural and 
substantive law in transnational cases” is not immune to critique.187 
Some argue that the trend heavily favors corporate defendants188—
indeed, corporations have celebrated the restrictions.189 Additionally, 
the limitations leave some plaintiffs without a remedy,190 deprive U.S. 
defendants of their preferred home forum, and force dispute resolution 
into foreign forums, which in turn decreases U.S. influence abroad and 
reduces the role played by the United States in the market for 
transnational litigation and in promoting human rights.191 Foreign 
states may retaliate by instituting blocking statutes or disfavoring U.S. 
companies, and U.S. companies may be competitively disadvantaged 
at home due to litigation costs that are increasingly irrelevant for 
foreign companies.192 
The Supreme Court acknowledges these criticisms but has 
repeatedly found them unpersuasive. Instead, the Court has relied on 
notions of litigation fairness and efficiency, separation of powers, 
international comity, respect for foreign relations and sovereignty, and 
concerns about forum shopping to support its current transnational 
litigation jurisprudence.193 Whether or not one agrees with the 
Supreme Court’s weighing of the interests when it comes to 
 
 187. Childress III, supra note 37, at 999. 
 188. See Bookman, supra note 133, at 1093 (noting that the outcome of McIntyre 
“encourag[es] foreign companies to avoid jurisdiction by structuring their business so as not to 
target individual states”); Steinitz, supra note 137, at 77 n.13 (“Domestically, Kiobel belongs to 
an expanding pro-corporate-defendant jurisprudence that has characterized the Supreme Court 
in recent history.”). 
 189. See CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 2 (“[R]ecent decisions have given American 
companies new tools to oppose the importation of foreign disputes into U.S. courts.”); id. at 42 
(noting that recent trends “should help courts and defendants more efficiently weed out 
international lawsuits that never should have been imported into the United States in the first 
place”). 
 190. See Gardner, supra note 26, at 432 (“[F]oreign corporations may no longer be susceptible 
to the general jurisdiction of any U.S. court.”). 
 191. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1124, 1127–28. 
 192. Id. at 1129. 
 193. See id. at 1100, 1123 (noting that separation of powers suggests that foreign affairs should 
be left to the political branches, international comity cautions respect for the regulatory authority 
of foreign states, and forum shopping creates inefficiencies that current jurisprudence redresses); 
Childress III, supra note 37, at 1041–42 (highlighting concerns about excessive litigation, case 
management, high costs, crowded dockets, respect for foreign policy, and a fear of “legal 
imperialism” as influences on the Court’s approach to transnational litigation). 
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transnational litigation, the Supreme Court is clearly charting it a 
narrow path in federal courts. 
Professor Gardner concludes that these doctrinal developments 
affecting transnational litigation render the FNC doctrine unnecessary, 
particularly given that “forum non conveniens increasingly provides 
defendants with an unjustified second (or third or fourth) bite at the 
apple of dismissal.”194 For Gardner, FNC “is dangerously redundant” 
and should be “retire[d].”195 But consistent jurisprudence and policy 
rationales favor the opposite: strengthening the doctrine’s utility by 
allowing for immediate appeals as of right from denials of motions to 
dismiss for FNC. Federal courts should be empowered to use the 
doctrine more aggressively, along with other doctrinal tools provided 
by the Supreme Court, to achieve the Court’s current preference for 
limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. If defendants 
receive another bite at the apple of dismissal as a result, the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to use the U.S. federal court system as a forum for 
transnational litigation justifies this opportunity.  
IV.  INCREASING FNC’S CONVENIENCE BY OVERTURNING BIARD 
This Part situates the Biard decision within the Supreme Court’s 
current trend of limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. 
While several methods exist for altering current doctrine to allow for 
immediate appeals as of right from denied FNC motions—including 
through new Supreme Court case law, Supreme Court rulemaking, or 
Congressional enactment—this Part argues that directly overturning 
Biard with new case law is the best option available and would allow 
the Court to use the FNC doctrine as an additional tool for achieving 
its stated policy objectives in restricting transnational litigation in U.S. 
federal courts.  
A. Overturning Biard Using New Case Law 
The most promising method to alter the rules of appealability for 
denials of motions to dismiss for FNC is through direct Supreme Court 
action. Most notably, the Court can and should revisit and revise its 
holding in Biard with new case law to allow such denials to fall within 
the collateral order doctrine. While stare decisis generally cuts against 
revisiting precedent, the Supreme Court was interpreting judge-made 
 
 194. Gardner, supra note 26, at 431. 
 195. Id. at 391. 
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doctrine in Biard rather than a federal statute, and the Court will afford 
less deference to stare decisis in this situation than when reviewing an 
act of Congress.196 Additionally, overruling Biard would not cause 
“significant damage to the stability of the society governed by” its 
rule,197 and a seeming lack of reliance by parties specifically on the 
appellate regime Biard endorses when making litigation decisions 
would weigh against giving its holding great deference.198 Moreover, 
the Court could easily distinguish the facts of Biard, which centered on 
a loan dispute, from the kinds of global transnational cases that have 
become more common in the three decades since the case was 
decided,199 and this further reduces the deference the Court should 
afford to Biard’s holding.200  
The Supreme Court has said that “the class of collaterally 
appealable orders must remain narrow and selective in its 
membership.”201 Orders held to meet the standards of the collateral 
order doctrine include: stays issued in light of ongoing state court 
proceedings;202 orders involving absolute, qualified, or sovereign 
immunity; and orders involving the criminal double jeopardy 
defense.203 Orders that do not meet the doctrine’s requirements, 
because the corresponding motions are available in almost every 
litigation, include those tied to personal jurisdiction, statutes of 
limitations, motions for summary judgment, and motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.204  
 
 196. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274 (2014) (“The 
principle of stare decisis has special force in respect to statutory interpretation because Congress 
remains free to alter what we have done.” (citation omitted)). 
 197. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992). 
 198. See id. at 854–55 (noting that the potential costs of overruling a decision increase if “the 
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of 
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation” (citation omitted)). 
 199. Again, the district court in Biard summarily denied the relevant motion to dismiss for 
FNC. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521 (1988). This lack of thorough district court 
review may have resulted from unique circumstances surrounding the case that are easily 
distinguishable from contemporary transnational litigation, including that the case involved two 
individual parties and that Van Cauwenberghe had previously been extradited to the United 
States, sentenced in related criminal proceedings, and prohibited from leaving the country. Id. at 
520. 
 200. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (indicating that “whether facts have so changed, or come to 
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification” 
reduces the amount of deference that the Court needs to give to the rule (citation omitted)).  
 201. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009) (citation omitted).  
 202. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1983). 
 203. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006). 
 204. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994). 
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Motions to dismiss for FNC cannot be made in every case. The 
federal transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404,205 applies to case 
transfers among U.S. federal courts, but it does not cover dismissals in 
favor of a foreign forum, which are still covered by the FNC doctrine.206 
This renders potential FNC cases, those seeking dismissal from the 
U.S. legal system entirely, a distinct and narrow class: “Between 1990 
and 2006, there were roughly 691 (about 43 per year) reported 
transnational forum non conveniens decisions by federal courts.”207 
This reality helps satisfy the collateral order doctrine’s requirement of 
covering categories of cases208 without fear that including FNC denials 
under the doctrine would inundate appellate dockets with immediately 
appealed FNC cases. 
Additionally, of the three requirements for an order to be 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,209 Biard 
only discussed the requirement that the order “resolve an important 
issue completely separate from the merits of the action.”210 The Court 
determined that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC did not meet 
this standard and fortified this conclusion with an understanding that 
appeals would remain available under § 1292(b).211 Yet, as explained in 
Part II above, reliance on § 1292(b) for appeals in FNC cases is 
misguided.212 Further, other judges have critiqued213 the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Biard that motions to dismiss for FNC “will 
substantially overlap factual and legal issues of the underlying 
dispute.”214 
 
 205. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2018). Section (a) of the statute states specifically that “[f]or the 
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any 
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or 
division to which all parties have consented.” Id. § 1404(a). 
 206. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 356 (reiterating that § 1404(a) “does not apply to 
dismissals in favor of foreign forums, which continue to be governed by the common law doctrine 
of forum non conveniens”). 
 207. Childress III, supra note 37, at 1036 (citation omitted). 
 208. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (“In fashioning a rule of 
appealability under § 1291, . . . we look to categories of cases, not to particular injustices.”). 
 209. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (outlining the contours of the collateral order 
doctrine). 
 210. Biard, 486 U.S. at 527 (citation omitted). 
 211. Id. at 529. 
 212. See supra Part II (highlighting the infrequent use and ineffectiveness of appeals under 
§ 1292(b)). 
 213. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s critique of 
Biard). 
 214. Biard, 486 U.S. at 529. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Sinochem International Co. v. 
Malaysia International Shipping Corp.215 is a starting point for this 
proposed reform. The Court’s reasoning in Sinochem is somewhat 
inconsistent—acknowledging that FNC is “a threshold, nonmerits 
issue” while also claiming that FNC decisions are too involved with a 
case’s merits to fit into the collateral order doctrine.216 This apparent 
contradiction should be resolved in favor of treating FNC as an issue 
truly distinct from the merits and consequently covered by the 
collateral order doctrine, particularly since Sinochem’s holding 
encouraged the use of FNC in certain situations before even reaching 
questions of personal jurisdiction.217 If the Supreme Court is adamant 
that FNC can be an immediate first avenue for dismissing a case, it 
makes sense for that determination to be immediately appealable so as 
to avoid ever wading into difficult jurisdictional questions and to be 
consistent with the Court’s trends against permitting transnational 
litigation in U.S. federal courts. 
Moreover, other than the Court’s stated preference for not 
expanding the collateral order doctrine,218 there is little to suggest why 
denied FNC motions as a class include too much factual and legal 
overlap with a case’s merits to qualify for collateral appeal. The 
Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A. case discussed above illustrates this 
point.219 A threshold determination of whether the United States or 
Peru is the more convenient forum need not wade into the merits of 
proving a wrongful death claim. The inquiries are conceptually distinct, 
and this will consistently be true for transnational litigation cases as a 
class.  
Further, other classes of motion denials that currently are 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine—most 
notably denials of motions for qualified immunity220—arguably include 
even more factual and legal overlap with a case’s merits than motions 
 
 215. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 216. Id. at 432–33. 
 217. See id. at 436 (holding that it is proper for courts to decide FNC motions prior to 
determining jurisdiction when jurisdictional questions are difficult and FNC factors favor 
dismissal).  
 218. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349–50 (2006) (noting that stringent conditions keep 
the class of collateral order cases small and in line with the doctrine’s policy goals and the benefits 
of finality). 
 219. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Will, 546 U.S. at 350 (identifying denials of qualified immunity as immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine). 
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to dismiss for FNC. For example, qualified immunity is a judicially 
developed common law doctrine invoked to provide government 
officials with immunity from civil damages claims.221 An official 
receives this qualified immunity unless she “violate[d] clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”222 Denial of qualified immunity is subject 
to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine223 despite the 
fact that, to determine whether immunity applies, a court must 
investigate the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct and 
whether that conduct violated clearly established law of which the 
officer should have been aware,224 both of which are arguably 
substantive inquiries.  
It is therefore unclear why the Supreme Court views FNC denials 
as too entangled with the merits to warrant appellate review under the 
collateral order doctrine. The Court has logical room to retreat from 
this holding and align with other judges who have made arguments that 
“[t]he decision on the merits[] . . . disposes of plaintiff’s substantive 
rights, while the [FNC] decision addresses defendant’s rights (and the 
rights of other participants in the law suit) to be tried in a forum 
convenient to them and to be free from vexatious and harassing 
litigation.”225 Additionally, as explained above, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence since the 2007 Sinochem case has decidedly restricted 
transnational litigation.226 Should the Court wish to revisit its 
understanding that FNC denials are too entangled with a case’s merits 
to fall within the collateral order doctrine, it can use its recent 
limitations on transnational litigation as justification.  
Stronger arguments exist that FNC denials also satisfy the first and 
third prongs for immediate appealability under the collateral order 
doctrine, both of which went unaddressed in Biard. Little doubt exists, 
for example, that FNC determinations “conclusively determine the 
disputed question,” which is the first requirement.227 Winning a motion 
to dismiss for FNC will remove a case from the U.S. legal system, a 
 
 221. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (noting that “immunity from suits for 
damages” for government officials stems from the common law). 
 222. Id. at 818. 
 223. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
 224. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 225. Nalls v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 702 F.2d 255, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
 226. See supra Part III (discussing recent trends in Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting 
transnational litigation in U.S. courts). 
 227. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
EIBLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:40 PM 
2019] MAKING FNC CONVENIENT AGAIN 1223 
rather conclusive outcome and one that is also consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s transnational litigation jurisprudence. Similarly, “it is 
hard to imagine [a] case becoming any less appropriate for trial” in a 
U.S. forum after a motion to dismiss for FNC has already been denied 
and significant expenditures of time and resources made in the case.228  
The third requirement of the collateral order doctrine—that an 
order “be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment”229—is also met in FNC cases. The “crucial question” 
relevant to the third prong of the collateral order doctrine is “whether 
deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to 
justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of 
relevant orders.”230 FNC denials meet this standard. Not only is waiting 
until after final judgment ineffective,231 but postponing review also 
severely threatens the interest at issue—“the right not to be tried in an 
unreasonably inconvenient forum.”232 This is true for the entire class of 
FNC cases, which all seek expulsion of the case from the U.S. legal 
system.  
Additionally, the goals of the FNC doctrine, including avoiding 
overcrowded dockets, preventing overuse of U.S. legal resources, and 
respecting foreign states’ policy choices,233 are some of the same 
interests that the Supreme Court has articulated when restricting 
transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts.234 Including orders 
denying motions to dismiss for FNC as a class within the collateral 
order doctrine by overturning Biard with new case law therefore 
supports the substantial public interest in limiting transnational 
litigation articulated by the Supreme Court while also remedying the 
lack of effective review for erroneous FNC denials. 
B. Altering the Biard Framework Through Rulemaking 
The Supreme Court could also achieve the same result through 
the rulemaking process. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 allows the Supreme Court “to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence 
 
 228. Nalls, 702 F.2d at 258 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
 229. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. 
 230. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009). 
 231. In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 232. Nalls, 702 F.2d at 260. 
 233. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 369–70. 
 234. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (describing rationales for the Supreme Court’s 
current case law trending against transnational litigation in U.S. courts). 
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for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals” 
that “may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the 
purposes of appeal under section 1291.”235 Additionally, 28 U.S.C 
§ 1292(e) states that “[t]he Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in 
accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of 
an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise 
provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).”236 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court has the authority to determine, by rule, that a denial of 
a motion to dismiss for FNC is final for purposes of appellate review. 
As it relates to this rulemaking power, the Supreme Court has 
highlighted that “rulemaking, not expansion by court decision, [is] the 
preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment 
orders should be immediately appealable.”237 In fact, the Court used its 
rulemaking authority to allow appellate courts to conduct interlocutory 
reviews of decisions granting or denying class certification requests.238  
Unfortunately, some values that the Supreme Court lauds about 
the rulemaking process—including that it seeks pragmatic solutions 
while also utilizing experience from judges and practitioners—can also 
serve as vices.239 If the Court tried to alter the appellate framework for 
denied FNC motions by following the measured and laborious 
approach it took in the class action context, which led to discretionary 
appellate court review of class certification orders, the Court may fail 
to improve FNC jurisprudence at all. Discretionary review for FNC 
denials technically exists already under § 1292(b), but this discretion is 
highly underutilized and ultimately ineffective.240 Further, plaintiff and 
defense bars are unlikely to agree on allowing immediate appellate 
review of denials of motions to dismiss for FNC given that, as with the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in other areas of transnational 
litigation, plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to believe that FNC dismissals 
disproportionately benefit corporate defendants.241  
Additionally, the FNC context is distinct from the class 
certification context. FNC denials will always more narrowly deal with 
questions relating to transnational litigation, while class certification 
 
 235. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (c) (2018). 
 236. Id. § 1292(e). 
 237. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009). 
 238. LOW ET AL., supra note 123, at 721. 
 239. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 114. 
 240. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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orders can apply to both transnational and domestic litigation contexts. 
This makes FNC denials better suited for inclusion under the collateral 
order doctrine. If the Supreme Court wants to turn the FNC doctrine 
into an even more useful tool for restricting transnational litigation in 
U.S. courts, it should seek to overturn Biard on its own and hold in new 
case law that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC are immediately 
appealable as of right under the collateral order doctrine.  
C. Seeking Legislation to Achieve Reform 
Finally, scholar Cassandra Burke Robertson has argued that 
congressional intervention is the most desirable method for achieving 
reform in this area.242 Congress may step in at any time to revise the 
FNC or collateral order doctrines, as both are judicially developed 
federal procedural common law.243 Doing so would align with the 
perspective that Congress is better situated than the courts to weigh 
transnational policy interests, including international comity and 
respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations.244  
Yet Congress is unlikely to pass such a statute,245 because “[a]part 
from imperfect foresight, Congress suffers from another shortcoming 
as a jurisdiction-managing institution—lack of interest.”246 Congress, 
for example, has never intervened to address the FNC doctrine, despite 
the doctrine’s long history in U.S. courts.247 There is little reason to 
believe that Congress will act in these areas now, and overturning 
Biard with new case law thus remains the best option for allowing 
immediate appeals as of right from denied motions to dismiss for FNC. 
 
 242. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 467–68 (identifying statutory intervention as the most 
desirable method for allowing appeals from denials of motions to dismiss for FNC). 
 243. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (2008) 
(“If Congress chooses to legislate, conflicting federal procedural common law must give way to 
federal statute.”). 
 244. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 468 (“Congress could better account for the relevant 
policy interests affected by [FNC]. Specifically, it could weigh comparative sovereign interests, 
foreign relations, and economic realities.”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role 
of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493, 534 (2011). 
 247. BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 37–38 (noting that the FNC concept in U.S. courts 
can be traced as far back as the year 1801). 
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V.  DEFENDING A CHANGE TO IMMEDIATE APPEALS AS OF RIGHT 
FROM DENIED MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FNC 
This Part addresses some additional plausible critiques to the 
argument that the Supreme Court should overturn Biard with new case 
law if it seeks to strengthen the FNC doctrine by allowing immediate 
appeals as of right from denied FNC motions in light of its goal to 
restrict transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. Objections may 
include that such appeals are unnecessary or that the FNC doctrine is 
itself so inherently flawed that any reform efforts are bound to fail.  
To begin, critics might argue that the Supreme Court does not 
need to alter the appellate scheme for FNC denials because the Court’s 
other efforts to limit transnational litigation in U.S courts either (i) 
sufficiently reduce the number of cases that merit dismissal through an 
FNC motion, rendering the doctrine unhelpful, or (ii) otherwise fulfill 
the same function as immediate appellate review of FNC denials 
without needing to expand the collateral order doctrine. Yet the 
Supreme Court sees the FNC doctrine as an integral component of its 
ability to analyze the proper forum for transnational litigation and does 
not endorse relegating the doctrine to a secondary role. For example, 
the recent dissent in Jesner and the opinion concurring in the judgment 
in Kiobel both highlighted the important role of the FNC doctrine in 
ensuring litigation takes place in the proper forum.248 Given the 
continued filing of motions to dismiss for FNC, allowing immediate 
appellate review of FNC denials under the collateral order doctrine 
would only increase the utility of the doctrine for this purpose.  
Other critics may suggest that inherent problems with FNC as a 
doctrine render futile any attempt to alter the appellate scheme for 
denied FNC motions. One way to make this type of argument is to 
assert that the FNC doctrine is unhelpful because it gives insufficient 
guidance for judges and leads to unpredictable results.249 Similar 
arguments claim that the doctrine infringes on comity and foreign 
relations considerations that it supposedly seeks to advance by cutting 
 
 248. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1430–31 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(highlighting that FNC serves alongside other tools, including narrowed grounds for personal 
jurisdiction, to dismiss transnational cases from U.S. courts); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 133 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the FNC 
doctrine serves as a limiting principle that “help[s] to minimize international friction”). 
 249. See Gardner, supra note 26, at 395 (“[S]cholars and judges alike have critiqued the 
doctrine for its poor design and overbroad discretion, the combination of which provides too little 
guidance for judges and thus too little predictability for parties.”). 
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off access to courts and imposing litigation on alternative forums.250 
Statistics indicating that 40 to 50 percent of motions to dismiss for FNC 
in published opinions are granted,251 and that over 95 percent of cases 
dismissed for FNC never reach trial in an alternative forum,252 may 
suggest that FNC dismissals are already too frequent and ultimately do 
not result in litigation continuing in an alternate forum. 
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, statistics regarding FNC 
motions can be misleading. They do not take into consideration 
countervailing factors that may prevent a case from going to trial in a 
foreign forum, including settlement negotiations. Moreover, looking at 
the grant rate for motions to dismiss for FNC in reported cases will not 
tell the full story of judicial reliance on the doctrine, as unreported 
cases are more likely to include denials of these motions than their 
published counterparts.253 Further, concerns about how disputes may 
proceed in an alternative forum must be calibrated against the idea, 
both in the United States and in foreign countries, that U.S. courts 
should not be “de facto world courts.”254  
Second, the discretionary nature of the FNC doctrine, which may 
make it appear to be inconsistently applied, is a common attribute of 
legal balancing tests that choose to sacrifice predictability in favor of 
more case-specific review.255 To the extent that concerns remain about 
consistent application of the doctrine or a lack of perceived guidance 
 
 250. See id. (highlighting the possibility of retaliation by a foreign forum in response to a 
dismissal based on FNC as harmful to long-term U.S. interests). 
 251. See id. at 396 (“[F]ederal judges grant roughly half of motions to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens, at least in written opinions.”); id. at n.33 (citing articles suggesting a dismissal rate of 
between 40 and 50 percent for motions to dismiss for FNC during different ranges of years studied 
between 1982 and 2012).  
 252. See Steinitz, supra note 137, at 77–78 (“[E]mpirical data available demonstrate that less 
than four percent of cases dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens ever reach trial 
in a foreign court.” (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, 
J., concurring))). 
 253. Cf. Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How 
Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 97 (2009) 
(“[P]ublished opinions . . . constitute only a small portion of opinions, and that portion is 
decidedly unrepresentative.” (citation omitted)); Weigand, supra note 118, at 220 (discussing that, 
in the context of § 1292(b) requests for interlocutory appeal, denials are more likely to go 
unreported than “grants of certifications and allowances of appeal”). 
 254. Steinitz, supra note 137, at 78–79. 
 255. See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 646 (2014) (“With 
rules, the Court can buy itself uniformity, predictability, and low decision costs, at the expense of 
rigidity, inflexibility, and arbitrary-seeming outcomes. With Standards, it can buy itself nuance, 
flexibility, and case-specific deliberation, at the expense of uncertainty, variability, and high 
decision costs.”). 
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for lower court judges, such worries can be assuaged by supporting the 
proposal to allow for immediate appellate review of denied motions to 
dismiss for FNC. 
It should also be noted that a federal appellate regime for motions 
to dismiss for FNC where both grants and denials of the motion are 
immediately appealable as of right has proven operational in the past. 
Both the Fourth Circuit and state courts so held prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Biard,256 and numerous states continue to allow for 
immediate appeals from denials of motions to dismiss from their own 
FNC doctrines.257 Canada, which also has an FNC doctrine,258 similarly 
has federal and provincial law that allows for immediate appeals as of 
right from denied motions to dismiss for FNC.259 If the Supreme Court 
wants to alter the current appellate regime to allow for immediate 
appeals as of right from denied FNC motions, concerns that such a 
framework is untenable are therefore non-starters. 
Moreover, the justifications for making this proposed doctrinal 
change should be clear in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. 
The Supreme Court has identified that “United States law governs 
domestically but does not rule the world.”260 Additionally, the Court’s 
jurisprudence seeks to avoid separation of powers concerns resulting 
from encroaching on the foreign policy expertise of the political 
branches.261 Further, general principles of comity restrain the court 
from “offending foreign nations or infringing on their regulatory 
authority.”262 Notably, international comity—“the recognition which 
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or 
 
 256. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 257. See, e.g., FL. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ix) (2018) (listing “the issue of forum non 
conveniens” as a non-final order from which appeal may be brought); 210 PA. CODE § 311(c) 
(2018) (“An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or proceeding changing 
venue, transferring the matter to another court of coordinate jurisdiction, or declining to proceed 
in the matter on the basis of forum non conveniens or analogous principles.”). 
 258. See BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 75–85 (discussing Canada’s FNC doctrine). 
 259. See, e.g., Federal Courts Act 27(1), R.S. 1985, c. F-7 (Can.) (stating that “[a]n appeal lies 
to the Federal Court of Appeal” from both final and interlocutory judgments of the Federal 
Court); Mazda Canada Inc. v. Cougar Ace (The), [2008] F.C.R. 219, paras. 25–27 (Can. Fed. Ct. 
App.) (reversing the lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC on immediate appeal 
and holding that Japan was the proper forum for the litigation); Bouzari v. Bahremani, 
[2015] ONCA 275, para. 54 (Can. Ont. Ct. App.) (reversing the lower court’s denial of a motion 
to dismiss for FNC on immediate appeal and finding England to be the proper forum). 
 260. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 261. Id. at 116. 
 262. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1100. 
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judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international 
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws”263—is increasingly 
important as the number of adequate alternative forums increases in 
quantity and overall desirability for litigants.264  
These systemic concerns regarding the role of the U.S. legal 
system and its federal courts have combined with practical 
considerations about fairness to defendants,265 the drain on U.S. 
resources of hearing unnecessary cases,266 and the reality that plaintiffs 
will forum shop for favorable rules and biased populations267 to 
incentivize the Supreme Court to limit transnational cases in U.S. 
federal courts. These considerations also justify immediate appellate 
review of denied motions to dismiss for FNC: without such review, a 
single trial judge’s decision may moot these policy interests by 
improperly keeping a case within the U.S. legal system without any 
effective method of appellate review.268  
Immediate appealability can also increase the predictability of the 
specific types of transnational cases that should not proceed in a U.S. 
federal court by allowing appellate panels to consistently review 
denials of FNC motions for consistency. This review then increases the 
amount of case precedent for lower court judges to use as guidance 
when applying the doctrine to new cases. Finally, defendants otherwise 
settling with plaintiffs out of convenience rather than merit may also 
be more willing to defend themselves through the legal process if they 
know that a panel of appellate judges—who arguably have a better 
view of systemic concerns regarding international comity or the types 
of cases that should not be heard in U.S. courts than individual district 
court judges more involved in the daily litigation process and motion 
practice with litigants—will review the merits of their FNC claim. 
 
 263. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
 264. See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 136, at 33–35 (juxtaposing a decrease in 
transnational litigation in U.S. courts alongside the increasing likelihood that other countries will 
be chosen in place of the United States as the forum for transnational litigation). 
 265. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (discussing the 
weight afforded to the “unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign 
legal system”).  
 266. See Childress III, supra note 37, at 1041–42 (discussing docket and case management 
concerns along with costs and abuses of litigation as reasons that U.S. courts are restricting 
transnational litigation). 
 267. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). 
 268. See supra Part II (outlining the ineffectiveness of all current methods for reviewing a 
denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC). 
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Immediate appellate review of denied FNC motions is therefore 
about more than performing standard error correction on appeal. Such 
review is about fulfilling systemic goals of the U.S. federal courts in 
limiting transnational litigation as articulated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. Immediate appellate review as of right from denied 
motions to dismiss for FNC would give the federal courts another 
mechanism by which to achieve this policy at the outset of a litigation 
and would also be consistent with Sinochem’s holding that motions to 
dismiss for FNC can be addressed even before standard personal 
jurisdiction issues.269 Ultimately, this outcome would be best 
achieved—and readily so—by the Supreme Court overruling Biard 
with new case law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has identified the dichotomy in the current appellate 
regime for motions to dismiss for FNC whereby grants of the motion 
are immediately appealable as of right but denials of the motion, under 
the Supreme Court’s Biard precedent, are not subject to immediate 
appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Altering this framework to 
allow for immediate appeals as of right from denied FNC motions 
would align with the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence limiting 
transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. The most 
straightforward way for the Court to make this change is to reverse its 
thirty-year-old holding in Biard with new case law. This would allow 
the Court to use the FNC doctrine as an additional tool to further its 
separation of powers, comity, fairness, and efficiency rationales for 
restricting the use of U.S. federal courts as a forum for transnational 
litigation. 
 
 269. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007) (holding 
that it is proper for courts to decide FNC motions prior to determining jurisdiction when 
jurisdictional questions are difficult and FNC factors favor dismissal).  
